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We present a family of quantum money schemes with classical verification which display a number
of benefits over previous proposals. Our schemes are based on hidden matching quantum retrieval
games and they tolerate noise up to 23%, which we conjecture reaches 25% asymptotically as
the dimension of the underlying hidden matching states is increased. Furthermore, we prove that
25% is the maximum tolerable noise for a wide class of quantum money schemes with classical
verification, meaning our schemes are almost optimally noise tolerant. We use methods in semi-
definite programming to prove security in a substantially different manner to previous proposals,
leading to two main advantages: first, coin verification involves only a constant number of states
(with respect to coin size), thereby allowing for smaller coins; second, the re-usability of coins within
our scheme grows linearly with the size of the coin, which is known to be optimal. Lastly, we suggest
methods by which the coins in our protocol could be implemented using weak coherent states and
verified using existing experimental techniques, even in the presence of detector inefficiencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography has traditionally been associated exclusively with quantum key distribution [1], but it
encompasses a much larger class of tasks and protocols [2]. Notable examples are quantum signature schemes [3–5],
two-party quantum cryptography [6–8], delegated quantum computation [9, 10], covert quantum communication and
steganography [11–14], quantum random number generation [15–17], quantum fingerprinting [18–21], and quantum
money [22–24]. Historically, many of these protocols have been extremely challenging to implement with available
technologies, but we are currently approaching a point where both theoretical and experimental developments have
made it possible for the first experimental demonstrations to emerge. We are thus entering an exciting stage where
practical quantum cryptography has begun to expand rapidly beyond the realms of quantum key distribution.
Quantum money, which was first suggested by Weisner in 1970 [22] as a means to create money that is physically
impossible to counterfeit, is one of the first examples of quantum cryptography. The basic aim of any quantum
money scheme is to enable a trusted authority, the bank, to provide untrusted users with finitely re-usable, verifiable
coins that cannot be forged. Verifiability ensures that honest users can prove the money they hold is genuine, while
unforgeability restricts the ability of an adversary to dishonestly fabricate additional coins. Potential drawbacks of
Weisner’s original scheme were that verification required quantum communication between the holder and the bank,
and moreover security of the scheme had not been proved rigorously. Indeed, it was shown in Refs. [25, 26] that many
variants of the scheme were vulnerable to so-called “adaptive attacks” – attacks in which the adversary is allowed a
number of auxiliary interactions with the bank before trying to forge a coin.
In 2012, Gavinsky [23] addressed both issues and presented a fully secure quantum money scheme in which coins
are verified using three rounds of classical communication between the holder of the coin and the bank. The scheme
was based on hidden matching quantum retrieval games (QRGs), first introduced in Ref. [27]. Nevertheless, the
scheme could not be considered practical, as the security analysis did not include the effects of noise. This issue was
addressed by Pastawski et al. [28], in which a noise tolerant quantum money scheme with classical verification was
proposed that remains secure as long as the noise is less than 12 − 1√8 ≈ 14.6%. The scheme requires only two rounds
of communication for verification and is secure even against adaptive attacks. Following this, Ref. [24] presented a
simpler protocol, again based on hidden matching QRGs, in which the verification procedure contained only a single
round of communication, and could tolerate up to 12.5% noise.
Beyond the secret-key quantum money schemes discussed above, there has also been significant interest in public-key
quantum money schemes, first proposed in [25], offering computational security against quantum adversaries. Since
then, Farhi et al. [29] introduced the concepts of quantum state restoration and single-copy tomography to further
rule out a large class of seemingly promising schemes. Following this result, Farhi et al. [30] suggested a scheme based
on knot theory and conjectured that it is secure against computationally bounded adversaries. However, whether
a secure public-key quantum money scheme exists without the use of oracles is an open question and, so far, the
majority of schemes that were proposed have subsequently been broken [31].
In this work, we focus on secret-key quantum money schemes with classical verification and propose a new scheme
based on hidden matching QRGs. Utilising semi-definite programming, we provide a full security proof of our scheme,
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2and show that by increasing the dimension of the underlying states, we can increase the error tolerance to as much
as 23.03% for states of dimension n = 14, while also proving that the maximum noise tolerance in that case is
23.3%. Thus, the error tolerance of our protocols is nearly optimal. We conjecture that for large dimension, the error
tolerance of our protocols approaches 25% asymptotically, and we further prove that 25% is the maximum possible
error tolerance for a wide range of quantum money protocols, including all those based on hidden matching QRGs.
Increasing the error tolerance has a twofold benefit: as well as allowing the protocol to be performed in regions of
higher noise than was previously possible, it also increases protocol efficiency since we show that security relies on the
size of the gap between the expected error rate and the maximum tolerable error rate of the scheme, thereby allowing
smaller coins. Finally, we discuss how our schemes can be implemented in practice using a coherent state encoding,
while also showing that they remain secure even in the presence of limited detection efficiency.
A. Definitions and Previous Results
In this section we state various definitions that are needed to introduce our quantum money schemes. We consider
the case of quantum money “mini-schemes” in which the bank creates only a single quantum coin and the adversary
attempts to use this coin to forge another copy. It has been shown in Ref. [32] that by adding a classical serial number
to each coin, a secure full quantum money scheme can be created directly from the secure mini-scheme, and so the
two are essentially equivalent.
Definition 1 A quantum money mini-scheme with classical verification consists of an algorithm, Bank, which creates
a quantum coin $ and a verification protocol Ver, which is a classical protocol run between a holder H of $ and the
bank B, designed to verify the authenticity of the coin. The final output of this protocol is a bit b ∈ {0, 1} sent by
the bank, which corresponds to whether the coin is valid or not. Denote by VerBH($) this final bit. The scheme must
satisfy two properties to be secure:
• Correctness: The scheme is -correct if for every honest holder, we have
Pr[VerBH($) = 1] ≥ 1− .
• Unforgeability: Coins in the scheme are -unforgeable if for any quantum adversary who has interacted a finite
and bounded number of times with the bank and holds a valid coin $, the probability that she can produce two
coins $1 and $2 that are verified by an honest user satisfies
Pr
[
VerBH($1) = 1 ∧VerBH($2) = 1
] ≤ ,
where H is any honest holder.
The first property guarantees that all honest participants can prove the coins they own are valid, while the second
property guarantees that a dishonest adversary cannot forge the coins. The definition covers adaptive attacks by
allowing the adversary to interact with the bank (via the verification procedure) a finite number of times before
attempting to forge the coin.
The schemes presented in this paper are based on quantum retrieval games (QRGs), which we have mentioned but
not formally introduced. A QRG is a protocol performed between two parties, Alice and Bob, and can be seen as a
generalisation of state discrimination. Alice holds an n-bit string x, selected at random according to a probability
distribution p(x), which she encodes into a quantum state ρx. She sends the state to Bob, whose goal is to provide a
correct answer to a given question about x. Mathematically, a question is modelled as a relation: if X is the set of
possible values x can take, and if A is the set of possible answers, the relation σ is a subset of X × A. If (x, a) ∈ σ,
this means that, given x, the answer a is a correct answer to the “question” σ. Formally, a quantum retrieval game
is defined as follows.
Definition 2 Let X and A be the sets of inputs and answers respectively. Let σ ⊂ X×A be a relation and {p(x), ρx}
an ensemble of states and their a priori probabilities. Then the tuple G = (X,A, {p(x), ρx}, σ) is called a quantum
retrieval game. If Bob may choose to find an answer to one of a finite number of distinct relations σ1, ..., σk, then we
write the game as G = (X,A, {p(x), ρx}, σ1, ..., σk).
A particularly useful class of QRGs are the hidden matching QRGs [23, 24, 33], in which the relations are defined
by matchings. A matching M on the set [n] := {1, 2, ..., n}, where n is an even number, is a partitioning of the set
3into n/2 disjoint pairs of numbers1. A matching can be visualised as a graph with n nodes, where edges define the
elements in the matching, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In general, there are 1 × 3 × . . . × (n − 1) = (n − 1)!! distinct
matchings of any set containing n elements. For our purposes, we focus on sets of matchings where no two matchings
in the set contain a common element. We call such sets pairwise disjoint. The maximum number of pairwise disjoint
matchings is n− 1, since if we consider the element 1 ∈ [n], it must be paired in each matching with a distinct integer
less than or equal to n.
Definition 3 A maximal pairwise disjoint set of matchings, R, is a set of pairwise disjoint matchings on [n] such
that |R| := n− 1.
A matching on the set [n] can be equivalently represented as a graph with n nodes, with each each element (i, j) of
the matching identified with an edge in the graph. Maximal pairwise disjoint sets of matchings for n = 4, 6, and 8
are illustrated in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: Maximal pairwise disjoint set of matchings for (a) n = 4, (b) n = 6 and (c) n = 8. Colour is used to represent each
matching within the maximal pairwise disjoint set.
In hidden matching QRGs the set of possible inputs is the set of all n-bit strings, each chosen with equal probability,
where n is an even number. Alice encodes her input into the n-dimensional pure state
|φx〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉 (1)
where xi is the i-th bit of the string x. The relations in this game are defined by the matchings: given a matching, the
correct answers are the ones which correctly identify the parity of the bits connected by an edge in the matching. For
example, if (1, 2) is an element of the matching, the measurement should output x1 ⊕ x2. Formally, given a perfect
matching M1, the set of answers is given by
A =
{
(i, j, b) : i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, b ∈ {0, 1}}
and the corresponding relation is
σ1 = {(x, i, j, b) : xi ⊕ xj = b and (i, j) ∈M1}.
Bob is able to find a correct answer to any matching of his choice with certainty simply by measuring in the basis
B = { 1√
2
(|i〉 ± |j〉)}, with (i, j) ∈M. (2)
This is because the outcome 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) can only occur if xi ⊕ xj = 0, and similarly 1√2 (|i〉 − |j〉) can only occur if
xi ⊕ xj = 1.
Previous quantum money schemes based on hidden matching QRGs have used only two matchings for verification.
In the following section, we generalise these schemes to the case of an arbitrary number of matchings and show that
this allows us to significantly increase the noise tolerance of the resulting schemes.
1 More precisely, this is actually the definition of a perfect matching.
4II. QUANTUM MONEY SCHEME
Here we present a quantum money scheme which is secure even in the presence of up to 23% noise. As in Ref. [24],
the verification protocol requires only one round of classical communication.
In this scheme, the bank randomly chooses a number of n-bit classical strings and encodes each of them into the
hidden matching states, given by Eq. (1). Essentially, the coin is a collection of these independent quantum states,
and each of the quantum states can be thought of as an instance of a QRG. We assume that there is a maximal
pairwise disjoint set of matchings on [n], known to all participants, which we call R. This set specifies the n − 1
possible relations defined within each QRG, and each state in the coin represents a QRG. To verify a coin, the holder
will pick a small selection of the states from the coin and randomly choose a relation for each. The holder will perform
the appropriate measurement (defined by Eq. (2)) to get an answer for each QRG under each chosen relation. The
holder then sends these answers to the bank which returns whether more than a specified fraction of the answers are
correct or not. If they are, the coin is accepted as valid; otherwise, it is rejected. The scheme is formally defined
below and illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3.
Bank Algorithm
1: The bank independently and randomly chooses q n-bit strings which we will call x1, ..., xq.
2: For i ∈ [q], the bank creates φxi := |φxi〉〈φxi |, where
|φxi〉 := 1√n
n∑
j=1
(−1)xij |j〉.
For each i we define the QRG Gi = (Si, Ai, {φxi}xi , σ1, ..., σn−1), where R = {σ1, ..., σn−1} is a maximal pairwise disjoint
set of matchings known to all participants in the scheme.
3: The bank creates the classical binary register, r, and initialises it to 0q.
4: The bank creates the counter variable s and initialises it to 0.
5: The pair ($, r) = (
⊗q
i=1 φxi , r) is the coin for the mini-scheme. The bank keeps the counter s in order to keep track of the
number of verification attempts.
Ver Algorithm
1: The holder of the coin randomly chooses a subset of indices, L ⊂ [q] such that ri = 0 for each i ∈ L. The indices i ∈ L
specify the selection of games Gi which will be used as tests in the verification procedure. For each i ∈ L, the holder sets
the corresponding bit of r to be 1 so that this game cannot be used in future verifications.
2: For each i ∈ L, the holder picks a relation σ′i at random from R and applies the appropriate measurement to obtain outcome
di.
3: The holder sends all triplets (i, σ′i, di) to the bank.
4: The bank checks that s < T , where T is the pre-defined maximum number of allowed verifications for the coin. If s = T ,
the bank declares the coin as invalid.
5: For each i, the bank checks whether the answer is correct by comparing (i, σ′i, di) to the secret x
i values. The bank accepts
the coin as valid if and only if more than l(c − δ) of the answers are correct, where c is a correctness parameter of the
protocol, l = |L|, and δ is a small positive constant.
6: The bank updates s to s+ 1.
We say that an instance of the verification algorithm has been passed/failed if the final output by the bank is
“valid”/“invalid” respectively. Coins can be verified at most T times until the Hamming weight of r is greater than
T l, at which point the coin is returned to the bank to be refreshed. We choose T to be small but linear in q. Any
such choice would be acceptable but, for the sake of definiteness, in what follows we set T := q/(1000l). We note that
having T scale linearly with q is optimal for any quantum money scheme [23] and that this is an improvement over
previous protocols (for example those in Refs. [23, 24]).
The parameter c represents the probability that an honest verifier obtains a correct outcome for a QRG in an honest
run of the protocol. In the ideal setting c = 1, since an honest participant in possession of a correct state will always
be able to get a correct answer to a relation. Of course, in practice system imperfections inevitably lead to errors
so that even when all participants are honest, it is not certain that the holder’s measurement will return a correct
answer. Thus, in the presence of errors, we must have c < 1, and the smallest value of c for which we can retain
security determines the noise tolerance of the protocol.
We note that this scheme requires the bank to maintain a small classical database to record the number of times
the verification protocol has been run – i.e. the bank’s database is “non-static”, and must be updated after each run
5Choose: Initialise:
x1 = 01011011, r = 0
q,
x2 = 11000010, s = 0.
...
xq = 10101110.
($, r) = (ρx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρxq , r)
FIG. 2: Schematic illustration of the Bank algorithm for n = 8. The bank selects q 8-bit strings and initialises the q-bit register
r to the zero string. The bank creates the corresponding hidden matching states and sends these, together with r, to the holder
of the coin.
r : 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 . . .
$ : ρx1 ρx2 HHρx3 ρx4 HHρx5 ρx6 ρx7 ρx8 . . .
M : σ′1 - - σ
′
4 - - σ
′
7 σ
′
8 . . .
→ d1 - - d4 - - d7 d8 . . .
−→ (1, σ′1, d1) (4, σ′4, d4) (7, σ′7, d7) (8, σ′8, d8) . . .
x : x1 x4 x7 x8 . . .
Outcome: X/× X/× X/× X/× . . .
s→ s+ 1
{(i, σ′i, di)}
FIG. 3: Schematic showing the verification algorithm. The verifier selects a sample {ρx1 , ρx4 , ρx7 , ρx8 , . . .} of the states contained
within the coin which have an r value of 0. He randomly chooses matching measurements and applies them to get classical
measurement outcomes which he sends to the bank, together with the index of the state and the matching chosen. The bank
checks these against its secret strings, as well as checking s < T . Finally, the bank declares an output based on the number of
incorrect outcomes.
of verification. Although this requirement demands more from the bank than completely static database models, we
believe the requirement is both minimal and realistic, and allows significant simplifications to the security analysis.
Nevertheless, in some cases it may be desirable for the bank to have a completely static database – for example in
applications in which the bank consists of many small, decentralised branches wary of attacks spanning multiple bank
locations. In this case, by adding an additional round of classical communication in the verification protocol, our
scheme can be transformed into a fully static database scheme which retains the same level of noise tolerance. Security
can be proved by directly applying the arguments in Ref. [23] to show that the additional verification attempts do
not (significantly) help the adversary2.
A. Security
In this section we prove that the scheme defined above is secure according to Definition 1.
2 We are able to apply the arguments in Ref. [23] because, although our scheme uses more than two matchings, when taken pairwise any
two matchings within our scheme are independent.
61. Correctness
Correctness of the scheme follows simply from the Hoeffding bound [34]. In the honest case, if the holder of a coin
has probability c of getting a correct answer for each of the l QRGs selected in the verification protocol, then his
probability of getting fewer than (c− δ)l correct answers overall is bounded by
P(Honest Fail) ≤ e−2lδ2 . (3)
Based on the security analysis in the following section, we choose δ to be half of the gap between the error rate an
honest participant expects and the minimum error rate the adversary can achieve. I.e. we set δ := (emin − β)/2,
where emin is the minimum error rate achievable by the adversary (derived below in Eq. (26)), and β := 1− c is the
error rate expected in an honest run of the protocol.
2. Unforgeability
We assume the adversary is in possession of a valid coin and first address a simple forging strategy available to
the adversary based on manipulating the r register attached to the coin. The adversary is allowed to set at most
q/1000 of the r register entries to 1. She creates ($1, r1) and ($2, r2) to send to the two honest verifiers, Ver1 and
Ver2 respectively. If she sets r1(i) = 1 and r2(i) = 0, she can be certain that Ver1 will not select the i’th state to
test, and so can forward the perfect state to Ver2. In this way, q/1000 of the states in the coins sent to each verifier
will be perfect, and will not cause errors. The remaining positions must have r register values of 0 for both verifiers.
Similarly, the adversary is able to use the auxiliary verification attempts to her advantage. We make a worst-case
assumption and assume that the adversary gets full knowledge of every state used in an auxiliary verification attempt.
Since there are at most T attempts allowed, each of which involve l states, the adversary knows the identity of at most
q/1000 of the states. Since the states are prepared independently, this knowledge does not provide any information
on the remaining states.
$1: r = 1 r = 0 Aux. Ver r = 0 and no Aux. Ver
1
1000
’th 1
1000
’th 1
1000
’th
$2: r = 0 r = 1 Aux. Ver r = 0 and no Aux. Ver
FIG. 4: Representation of the states within the quantum coins sent to the verifiers. The first block on the far left represents all
states for which the adversary set r = 1 for Ver1, and r = 0 for Ver2. The adversary knows that Ver1 cannot select these states
for testing, and so is able to forward on the perfect states to Ver2. The second block of states represents the same, but with
the roles of the verifiers reversed. The Aux. Ver states in the diagram are the ones that we assume are known to the adversary
via auxiliary verifications. The remaining states in white are the ones we consider below – those states for which the r register
is zero for both verifiers, and which have not been used in auxiliary verifications.
The combined effect of the above two strategies is that the adversary is able to exactly replicate q/500 of the states
in the coin, as shown in Fig. 4. To prove coins are unforgeable, we consider the remaining 997q/1000 states for which
the r register is zero for both verifiers, and for which the adversary has no auxiliary information. In reference to Fig.
4, we refer to these states as the white states, and start by considering a single such state, φxi := |φxi〉 〈φxi |, contained
in the coin. For simplicity, we drop the superscript on the n-bit strings xi in all that follows.
The idea behind the proof is to relate the probability that the forger can use a single white state to create two
states that pass the verification test of the two honest verifiers, to the average fidelity of these two states with the
original state |φx〉. The maximisation of this average fidelity corresponds to the optimal attack, which can be cast as a
semi-definite program. By focusing on the dual program, we can upper bound the value of the semi-definite program
and therefore bound the forging probability of the adversary. Lastly, we show that coherent attacks on multiple states
cannot help the adversary to forge.
7Since the adversary has a valid coin, she holds the unknown state
|φx〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉. (4)
From this state, the adversary wishes to create two states, ηx and τx, which, when measured by the honest verifiers,
will give the correct answer to a randomly chosen relation in R. Consider the normalised state sent to Ver1,
ηx =
n∑
i,j=1
aij |i〉〈j|. (5)
Suppose the verifier chooses to measure using the matching Mα = {(i1, j1), ..., (in/2, jn/2)}, where α ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1}.
To find a correct answer to the relation σα defined by this matching, an honest verifier will apply the measurement
with projectors in the set {|+ikjk〉 〈+ikjk | , |−ikjk〉 〈−ikjk | : k = 1, ..., n/2}, where |±ikjk〉 := 1√2 (|ik〉 ± |jk〉). An
incorrect result is obtained whenever the verifier finds an incorrect value for xik ⊕ xjk , which happens whenever the
measurement outcome is one of the form
1√
2
(|i〉 − (−1)xi⊕xj |j〉). (6)
This happens with probability
pα,xVer1 =
1
2
1− n/2∑
k=1
(−1)xik⊕xjkaikjk + (−1)xik⊕xjkajkik
 . (7)
Thus, the probability of an incorrect answer to σα is given by a subset of the off-diagonal elements of the density
matrix ηx. The off-diagonal elements occurring are exactly those with indices paired by the matching Mα. Since
the set of relations form a maximal pairwise disjoint set, the off-diagonal matrix elements appearing in the error
probability for different relations will all be distinct. Therefore, averaging over all possible relations that could be
chosen by the verifier allows us to significantly simplify the adversary’s error probability, which becomes
pxVer1 =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
α=1
pα,xVer1 =
1
2(n− 1)
n− n∑
i,j=1
(−1)xi⊕xjaij
 = n
2(n− 1)(1− Fx), (8)
where we have defined
Fx := 〈φx|ηx|φx〉 = 1
n
∑
i,j
(−1)xi⊕xjaij . (9)
Since the adversary does not know the secret string x, rather than holding the state in Eq. (4), she instead holds a
mixture over the possible x values. We define F := 12n
∑
x Fx and take an average over x values to get
pVer1 =
1
2n
∑
x
pxVer1 =
1
2n
∑
x
n
2(n− 1) (1− Fx) =
n
2(n− 1) (1− F ) . (10)
Essentially then, to successfully forge a coin, the adversary is trying to create two states, ηx and τx, which both have
a high fidelity with the original state |φx〉. Let’s define Gx = 〈φx|τx|φx〉, and G := 12n
∑
xGx. For the purpose of
forging, the adversary needs both Ver1 and Ver2 to accept the coin she sends, which requires her to make both error
probabilities as small as possible. From the above result, we can relate this to maximising the average fidelity of the
states ηx and τx with the original state. This problem can be cast as a semi-definite program as follows.
Let Ψ : L(X ) → L(Y ⊗ Z) be a physical channel taking states in Hilbert space X to states in the Hilbert space
Y ⊗ Z, where both Y and Z are isomorphic to X . We want to find the channel that maximises
F =
1
2n
2n∑
x=1
〈φx|ηx|φx〉+ 〈φx|τx|φx〉
2
, (11)
where ηx = TrZ [Ψ(|φx〉〈φx|)] and τx = TrY [Ψ(|φx〉〈φx|)]. In other words, ηx is the reduced state of the channel
output representing the state held by Ver1, and τx is the reduced state of the channel output representing the state
8held by Ver2. This maximisation is subject to Ψ being a completely positive trace preserving linear map. To express
this maximisation in the standard form of a semi-definite program, we express the channel as an operator using the
Choi representation. We fix the preferred basis to be {|i〉}i=1,...,n, the basis used to define the hidden matching
states in the ensemble. Given this choice, the Choi operator corresponding to the channel Ψ is an operator J(Ψ) in
L(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z), given by
J(Ψ) =
n∑
i,j=1
|i〉〈j|X ⊗Ψ(|i〉〈j|)YZ (12)
Using the facts that 〈φx|i〉 = 〈i|φx〉 for all states in the ensemble, and that Ψ is a linear map, it can be shown that
TrXYZ
[(
φXx ⊗ φYx ⊗ 1Z
)
J(Ψ)
]
= 〈φx|ηx|φx〉Y , (13)
and similarly that
TrXYZ
[(
φXx ⊗ 1Y ⊗ φZx
)
J(Ψ)
]
= 〈φx|τx|φx〉Z , (14)
where here, for ease of notation, we have used the superscript to denote the relevant Hilbert space. With this we can
rewrite the problem in Eq. (11) as the problem of finding the operator J(Ψ) which maximises
1
2n+1
2n∑
x=1
TrXYZ
[(
(φXx ⊗ φYx ⊗ 1Z) + (φXx ⊗ 1Y ⊗ φZx )
)
J(Ψ)
]
. (15)
The conditions that the channel must be completely positive and trace preserving lead to the conditions that J(Ψ) must
be positive semidefinite and TrYZ(J(Ψ)) = 1X . Written in standard form, the semidefinite program corresponding
to the maximum average fidelity is given by
Maximise: 〈Q(n), X〉
subject to: TrYZ(X) = 1X
X ≥ 0,
(16)
where
Q(n) =
1
2n+1
2n∑
x=1
(
(φXx ⊗ φYx ⊗ 1Z) + (φXx ⊗ 1Y ⊗ φZx )
)
. (17)
The dual problem is simply
Minimise: Tr(Y )
subject to: 1YZ ⊗ Y ≥ Q(n)
Y ∈ Herm(X ),
(18)
since 〈1X , Y 〉 = Tr(Y ) and the adjoint of the partial trace is the extension by the identity. The dual problem
approaches the optimal value from above, so any feasible point (i.e. any operator Y that satisfies the constraints of
the dual problem) gives us an upper bound on the maximum average fidelity. A feasible point can easily be found in
terms of the matrix Q(n) as
Y = ||Q(n)||∞1X (19)
so that we arrive at the following upper bound on the average fidelity:
F ≤ n||Q(n)||∞. (20)
Thus, for quantum money protocols using states of dimension n and a maximal disjoint set of matchings, we can
upper bound the error probability of the adversary in terms of the operator norm of Q(n). Computing this norm for
different values of n leads to the bound
F ≤ 1
2
+
1
n
(21)
9which we have verified numerically for n ≤ 14 and we conjecture holds for any n. From now on, we simply assume
that n ≤ 14. The analysis above enables us to restrict the achievable error probabilities for the two verifiers on a
single game as
pVer1 =
n
2(n−1) (1− F )
pVer2 =
n
2(n−1) (1−G)
}
subject to:
1
2
(F +G) ≤ 1
2
+
1
n
, (22)
which leads to
pVer1 + pVer2 ≥
1
2
− 1
2(n− 1) . (23)
Until now, we have considered only a single white state out of the l games used in the verification protocol. Let us
now consider l such games, and let p
(i)
Verj
be the error probability for honest verifier j on the i’th run of the verification
protocol. We claim that when we have l independent white states (in the sense that each xi is chosen independently),
it is still the case that
p
(i)
Ver1
+ p
(i)
Ver2
≥ 1
2
− 1
2(n− 1) (24)
for all i, regardless of the outcomes of previous measurements made by the verifiers. Though intuitively reasonable,
this claim is far from trivial, but can be proved using a teleportation argument due to Croke and Kent [35] (See
Appendix A) so that, essentially, we can imagine the adversary acts independently on each game in the verification
protocol. Therefore, on each and every white state, at least one verifier must have an error probability of at least
1
2
(p
(i)
Ver1
+ p
(i)
Ver2
) =
1
4
− 1
4(n− 1) . (25)
Overall, if we include the effects of r register manipulation and auxiliary verifications, at least one verifier, say Ver1,
must have an average error probability over all l games of at least
emin =
997
999
(
1
4
− 1
4(n− 1)
)
≈ 1
4
− 1
4(n− 1) (26)
Using Hoeffding’s inequality, the probability of both verifiers accepting the coin can be bounded as
P(Both Ver1 and Ver2 generate outcome “Valid”) ≤ P(Ver1 generates outcome “Valid”) ≤ e−2lδ2 , (27)
where δ = (emin − β)/2, as above. As long as β < emin, the Hoeffding bound can be used to show that it becomes
exponentially unlikely for both verifiers to pass the verification protocol. By increasing the maximum noise tolerance
of the protocol we increase the size of δ, thereby allowing smaller sample sizes in the verification protocol, which
increases the re-usability of coins. If we choose n = 4, our scheme would be able to tolerate 16.6% noise, and for
n = 14 it can tolerate up to 23% noise. This concludes the proof of security against forging.
In the next section, we prove an upper bound on the error tolerance achievable for a general class of classical
verification quantum money schemes, and show this bound limits to 25% as the dimension of the underlying states is
increased. This implies that our protocols are nearly optimal in terms of error tolerance. When proving this result,
we assume only that the coin is a collection of quantum states each identified with a secret classical string, and that
to verify the coin the holder must declare a number of single bit values which can be checked against the classical
record.
III. MAXIMUM ACHIEVABLE NOISE TOLERANCE
Suppose we have a scheme in which the coin consists of many independently chosen n-dimensional pure quantum
states, φx = |φx〉〈φx|, with x ∈ X and where x is a classical bit string chosen according to some probability distribution.
To verify each state, the holder performs some POVM,Mx = {M corx ,M incx }, to ascertain one bit of information about
each of the states used in the verification protocol. The bit values resulting from the measurement outcomes are
checked against a classical record to verify whether the coin is genuine or not.
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Lemma 1 For any quantum money scheme of the above type, the maximum tolerable noise, emax, must be less than
emax ≤ 1
2
− 1
4
n+ 2
n+ 1
. (28)
Proof. We prove this by explicitly illustrating a strategy available to the adversary. The adversary holds the unknown
state φx, which lives in Hilbert space H. She extends the state to φx ⊗ Φ, where Φ = 1n1n, and symmetrises the
system. Specifically, she performs the mapping
φx ⊗ Φ→ S2(φx ⊗ Φ)S2, (29)
where S2 is the projector onto H2+, the symmetric subspace of H⊗2, and where the state on the right hand side is not
normalised. The resulting normalised state of each clone is [36]
ηx = vφx + (1− v)Φ, (30)
where v := 12
n+2
n+1 . By the correctness requirement of quantum money schemes, an honest measurement on the correct
state should always give a correct answer so that the coin is declared valid, i.e.
Tr(M corx φx) = 1. (31)
We further assume that, without access to the state φx, the adversary has no information on x and can do no better
than to guess randomly. This means her probability of declaring a correct bit value is 1/2, i.e.3
Tr(M corx Φ) = 1/2. (32)
Both honest verifiers hold the state ηx. Using Eqs. (31) and (32), the probability that an honest verifier gets a correct
measurement outcome is
Tr(M corx ηx) = vTr(M
cor
x φx) + (1− v)Tr(M corx Φ) = v +
(1− v)
2
. (33)
Expressing v in terms of the dimension of the system shows that this strategy (which is always available to the
adversary) leads to the honest verifiers finding an error rate of
emax =
1
2
− 1
4
n+ 2
n+ 1
, (34)
and so for any such scheme to be secure an honest participant must expect an error rate less than emax in an honest
run of the protocol.
Our analysis shows that for any scheme with n = 4 the tolerable noise is at most 20%, which complements our
results in Section II A where we described a protocol with n = 4 which tolerated noise up to 16.6%. For n = 14, the
bound in this section shows that any such scheme has a noise tolerance of at most 23.3%. For n = 14, our protocol
can achieve an error tolerance of 23.03%, and so it is nearly optimal. As we increase the dimension of the quantum
states used for the coins, the upper bound on the tolerable noise approaches 25% which coincides with our conjecture
for the tolerable noise in our protocols above.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
The protocol presented in Section II gives rise to three main technical challenges when one considers experimental
implementations, namely: the security analysis provided does not account for losses; the bank requires a source of
complex, high-dimensional states; and the protocol requires that the coin holders have the ability to store states in
quantum memory. In this section we address the first two issues so that a proof-of-principle implementation of the
verification algorithm of the quantum money schemes could be performed with current technology.
3 Note that this assumption holds for all hidden matching quantum money schemes considered, and for any scheme in which the verification
protocol involves declaring many single bit values which are later checked. Nevertheless, there may be protocols in which the verification
protocol involves checking many m-bit outcomes, in which case the more reasonable assumption would be
Tr(Mcorx Φ) = 1/2
m.
To our knowledge such a scheme does not exist, but if higher error tolerance is desired our proof suggests looking into such schemes.
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FIG. 5: Plot showing the theoretical bound on protocol noise tolerance (dotted line) and the noise tolerance achieved by the
protocols in Section II (bold line) as the dimension of the underlying systems increase.
A. Detector Losses
Here we tackle the first of the issues, and consider an implementation in which the verifiers use imperfect detectors
with efficiency η. We assume that all detector losses are random and cannot be manipulated by the adversary. In
this paper we do not consider channel loss, as we assume that coin transfers occur over short distances, meaning
channel losses are less relevant. Nevertheless, many of the methods presented here would remain valid in the presence
of small channel loss with only minor modifications necessary. To incorporate detector loss, it is necessary to modify
the verification protocol, previously stated in Section II, so that it becomes:
Ver Algorithm
1: The holder randomly chooses a subset of indices, L ⊂ [q], with l = |L|, such that ri = 0 for each i ∈ |. The indices i ∈ L
specify the selection of games Gi which will be used as tests for the verification procedure. For each i ∈ L, the holder then
sets the corresponding bit of r to be 1 so that this game cannot be used in future verifications.
2: For each i ∈ L, the holder picks a relation σ′i at random from R and applies the appropriate measurement to get answer
di. If there is no measurement outcome we say the measurement was unsuccessful and set di = ∅. We define the number
of successful measurement outcomes to be l′.
3: If l′ < lmin := (η − )l, where  > 0 is a small security parameter, the verifier aborts the protocol.
4: The holder sends all triplets (i, σ′i, di) to the bank.
5: The bank checks that s < T , where T is the pre-defined maximum number of allowed verifications for the coin. If s = T ,
the bank declares the coin as invalid.
6: For each i, the bank checks whether the answer is correct by comparing (i, σ′i, di) to the secret x
i values. The bank ignores
those outcomes for which di = ∅, and accepts the coin as valid only if more than l′(c− δ) of the answers are correct, where
c = 1− β is a measure of the channel correctness and δ is a small positive constant.
7: The bank updates s to s+ 1.
1. Correctness
Correctness of the scheme follows from Hoeffding’s inequality. When all participants are honest, it is exponentially
unlikely for l′ to be less than lmin, so the protocol will not abort, except with a negligible probability. If the protocol
does not abort, the verifier has at least lmin successful measurement outcomes, each with an independent probability
c of being correct. Overall, the probability of the verification failing is bounded by
P(Ver fails) ≤ exp [−2lminδ2]+ exp[−2l2], (35)
where now δ = (e′min − β)/2, with e′min derived in Eq. (39) below as the minimum average error rate achievable by
the adversary.
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2. Unforgeability
Since the protocol now includes detector losses, the adversary may not have to send states to each verifier for each
game in the verification protocol, and she could attempt to hide losses arising from her strategy in the losses arising
from detector inefficiency. As a consequence, the set of strategies available to the adversary is increased, and we must
make sure our arguments in Section II A still apply.
Let U1 and U2 be q-bit strings representing whether or not the adversary sent a state to Ver1 and Ver2 respectively,
for each of the q games created by the bank. An entry of 1 means the adversary sent a state to the verifier, while an
entry of 0 means the adversary did not send a state to the verifier. We want to show that, in order for the protocol
not to abort, W (Ui) ≥ γq, where γ := 1− 3η and W is the Hamming weight. Suppose W (Ui) = γq. Then, in Step 1
of the verification protocol, Veri takes a sample, Vi, consisting of l of the entries of Ui. Hoeffding’s inequality gives
P
(
W (Vi) ≤ (γ + 
η
)l
)
≥ 1− exp[−2 
2
η2
l]. (36)
If W (Vi) ≤ (γ + η )l, then the probability of at least lmin successful measurement outcomes is given by
P
(
At least lmin successful measurement outcomes | W (Vi) ≤ (γ + 
η
)l
)
≤ exp[−2l2]. (37)
The probability of the protocol proceeding past Step 3 of verification is therefore
P (No Abort|W (Ui) = γq) ≤ exp[−2 
2
η2
l] + exp[−22l]. (38)
In what follows we assume W (Ui) ≥ γq, since otherwise the above shows that the verifiers will abort with near
certainty. This means the adversary is able to use any strategy that leads to channel losses of at most 3η for each
verifier, as these can be hidden within the normal fluctuations of detector loss. Suppose there is a strategy which
gives at least (1 − 3η )q states to each verifier, and which leads to an average error probability (on only the states
tested) of e′min for at least one of the verifiers. Then, there is a strategy which gives q states to each verifier, and
leads to an average error probability for at least one of the verifiers of (1− 3η )e′min + 32η (the adversary simply sends
the maximally mixed state to each verifier in place of the 3η losses). Since this strategy falls under the scope of the
analysis in Section II A, we know that the resulting error rate must be at least emin, which means
e′min ≥
emin − 32η
1− 3η
. (39)
The parameter  can be chosen to be arbitrarily small by increasing the sample size l. As such, the protocol is able
to handle arbitrarily large detector losses, and leads to noise tolerance that can be kept arbitrarily close to the noise
tolerance derived for the case of perfect detectors.
Each verifier tests at least lmin states, and at least one verifier expects an error rate of e
′
min. The probability of
this verifier passing the test is bounded as
P (Observed error rate smaller than e′min − δ) ≤ exp[−2lminδ2]. (40)
Combining Eqs. (38) and (40), the probability that the adversary is able to forge a coin is given by
P (Forgery) ≤ exp[−2 
2
η2
l] + exp[−2l2] + exp[−2lminδ2] (41)
B. Coherent State Implementation
In this section we tackle the second issue arising when considering experimental realisations of the scheme – the
bank must create hidden matching states of the form in Eq. (1), which are high-dimensional states of high complexity.
The implementation of hidden matching quantum retrieval games has been studied extensively in Ref. [33], where
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the coherent state mapping defined in Ref. [37] was used to approximate each hidden matching state by a sequence
of n coherent states of the form
|α, x〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
k=0
αk
k!
(a†x)
n |0〉
=
n⊗
i=1
∣∣∣∣(−1)xi α√n
〉
, (42)
where
a†x =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xib†i (43)
and {b†1, b†2, . . . , b†n} are the creation operators of the n modes. We call each sequence of coherent states a block, so
that a single block is used to approximate a hidden matching state. As outlined in Ref. [33], Bob’s measurement can
then be performed using linear optics circuits and single photon detectors.
In the absence of a phase reference, the phase of each block is randomised, which implies that each block is equivalent
to a classical mixture of number states [38]. More specifically, writing α = eiθ|α|, we have∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|α, x〉〈α, x| = e−|α|2
∞∑
k=0
|α|2k
k!
|k〉〈k|x, (44)
where |k〉〈k|x is a state of k photons in the mode a†x. Thus, the probability of obtaining a particular number of
photons depends only on α, which is a free parameter within the coherent state mapping. We consider the following
three cases:
1. Zero photons in the block
In this case the state emitted is simply the vacuum state. If the adversary chooses to forward a state on to the
verifiers, she can do no better than to induce a 50% error rate, and it is simple to show that it is never beneficial
for her to do so. This scenario can therefore be considered a “source” loss, as opposed to a channel or detector loss.
Crucially, since these losses are not controllable by the adversary, they can be treated in the same manner as detector
losses in Section IV A simply by including the source loss into the detector loss parameter, η. The probability of zero
photons being emitted is p0 = e
−|α|2 .
2. One photon in the block
In this case, the state emitted is equivalent to the ideal hidden matching state in Eq. (1) since
|1〉x = a†x |0〉
=
1√
n
n∑
i=1
b†i |0〉
=
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉 , (45)
where |i〉 is a single photon state in the mode bi. Therefore, whenever the bank’s source emits a single photon, the
analysis in Section II A applies. The probability of one photon being emitted is p1 = |α|2e−|α|2 .
3. More than one photon in the block
In this case we assume the worst case scenario: whenever the source emits more than one photon to represent
a hidden matching state, the adversary can perfectly forge that state. The resulting error rate for the adversary is
e′min(
p1
p1+p2+
), where p2+ = 1−p0−p1. For small |α|, p2+ ≈ |α|
4
2 , while p1 ≈ |α|2, so that p2+  p1 and the adversary’s
error probability is almost unchanged by using coherent states.
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V. CONCLUSION
We presented a family of unconditionally secure classical verification quantum money schemes which are tolerant
to noise up to 23%, and which we conjecture tolerate noise up to 25%. We further proved that 25% is the maximum
noise tolerance achievable for a wide class of quantum money schemes, including all classical verification secret-key
schemes previously proposed. The security of our schemes depends on the difference between maximum tolerable
noise and expected noise, meaning the increase in maximum tolerable noise increases the efficiency of our scheme,
allowing for smaller, more re-usable coins. The techniques we use to prove security differ considerably to previous
papers, and the re-usability of our coins is optimal [23] in that it scales linearly with the number of qubits in the coin.
This is a significant improvement when compared to Ref. [24], in which the re-usability scales as q1/3, and Ref. [23],
in which re-usability scales as q1/4, where q is the total number of qubits in the coin. With realistic assumptions on
experimental equipment, we expect that, using n = 8, a coin containing 109 qubits would use l = 18, 000 states for
each verification, and would be re-usable T = 100 times for a security level of 10−6. Lastly, we suggested methods of
adapting our techniques to facilitate experimental implementations of the scheme. We show that the schemes can be
implemented using weak coherent states even in the presence of limited detector efficiency.
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VI. APPENDIX A
A. Overview of Argument
In the main paper, we claim that the adversary cannot use coherent attacks on multiple states in order to beat
the bound given in Eq. (23), even when conditioned on the states chosen by the bank, and on the outcomes of
previous measurement results found by the verifiers. In this section we formally prove our claim using a teleportation
argument similar to the one introduced by Croke and Kent in Ref. [35], so that each game can essentially be viewed
as independent of all others.
In order to apply the teleportation argument, we must first introduce a modified individual setting, in which the
adversary is allowed an additional ability. We show that this modification does not help the adversary to cheat. We
then show that any coherent strategy can be transformed into a modified individual strategy. Therefore, any coherent
strategy cannot beat the bounds proved for the unmodified individual case, as claimed.
B. Modified Individual Attacks
In the individual setting, the verifiers each receive a single hidden matching state and apply the verification protocol
to test its authenticity. As specified by the protocol, the verifiers randomly choose to measure the state they receive
using one of the matching measurements. We include this random choice of matching into the mathematical description
of the measurement, and group the outcomes to be either “correct” or “incorrect”. It can be shown that if the bank
creates φx = |φx〉 〈φx|, the verifiers measurement is described by the POVM
Γx = {Γcor,x,Γinc,x} = n
2(n− 1)
{
n− 2
n
I+ φx, I− φx
}
. (46)
Suppose now the adversary has the additional power of being able to force the verifiers to apply a correction unitary
(which will be the teleportation corrections) to their measurement outcomes before they are sent to the bank. The
adversary must specify the correction operation before sending the states to the verifiers, and, crucially, the correction
operation is such that it is simply a permutation of the set of hidden matching states. For example, suppose the
teleportation operation takes input |φx〉 and outputs |φx′〉, with correction operator C. In this case, before sending
the states, the adversary will tell the verifiers that they must apply correction C to their measurement outcomes. In
effect then, the verifiers will measure
Γx′ = {Γcor,x′ ,Γinc,x′} = n
2(n− 1)
{
n− 2
n
I+ φx′ , I− φx′
}
, (47)
since the correction applied to Γinc,x
′
is Γinc,x. On average, given φx, it is not possible for the adversary to create two
states, ηx and τx, such that Tr[Γ
inc,x′(ηx + τx)] < p. If it were possible, then it would imply that the adversary can
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clone φx′ better than what is allowed by quantum mechanics (and our arguments in the main paper). This is because
if the adversary was given φx′ he could easily transform it to φx by applying C, and then perform the strategy to get
two copies with a fidelity higher than the bound proved in the main paper. Therefore the additional power given to
the adversary does not allow her to decrease the value of pVer1 + pVer2 .
C. Coherent Strategy
We now consider the case of N games created by the bank. The bank creates
1
2Nn
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |φx1〉 〈φx1 |A ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2 |B . (48)
The X1 and A registers contain the first N − 1 secret strings selected by the bank and the corresponding hidden
matching states, respectively. The X2 and B registers contain the N ’th secret string selected by the bank and its
corresponding hidden matching state. Only the A and B registers are accessible to the adversary. We assume for
a contradiction that there exists a strategy available to the adversary such that, conditional on the value in the
X1 register, and conditional on the verifiers obtaining specific outcomes in previous measurements, the value of
pVer1 + pVer2 in the N ’th game is decreased below the bound in Eq. (23).
We describe this strategy as follows – upon receiving the states from the bank, the adversary applies the unitary
operation SABC so that the state becomes
1
2Nn
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ SABC
(
|φx1〉 〈φx1 |A ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2 |B ⊗ |0〉 〈0|C
)
S†ABC
=
1
2Nn
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |AA′BB′C′ .
(49)
The A,A′ registers are the spaces that contain the states that will be sent to Ver1 and Ver2 (resp.) for the first N − 1
games. The B,B′ registers are the spaces that contain the states that will be sent to Ver1 and Ver2 (resp.) for the
N ’th game. The C registers are auxiliary registers held by the adversary. We assume that the bank measures the
X1 register, and gets a state, x1, which satisfies the conditions in the assumption. The state held by the adversary is
then
1
2n
∑
x2
|Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 | . (50)
The adversary gives the A,A′, B,B′ parts of the state to the verifiers. The honest verifiers will first make measurements
on systems A,A′ and a possible post measurement state is
1
2n
∑
x2
ax1x2ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |Π†AA′ . (51)
We assume that ΠAA′ is a measurement outcome satisfying the conditions of the assumption, so that the error probabil-
ities on the N ’th game are decreased. Here ax1x2 is the normalisation term, ax1x2 = 1/Tr
[
ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |Π†AA′
]
.
The verifiers now each measure Γx2 , as defined in Eq. (47), on their B system. The assumption tells us that
1
2n
∑
x2
[
ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |Π†AA′
]
+ ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B′ ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |Π†AA′
]]
< p. (52)
We now aim to prove that this leads to a contradiction.
D. Teleportation strategy
Supposing the above strategy exists, we explore what this enables the adversary to do in the individual case in the
hopes of finding a contradiction. We suppose the bank creates
1
2n
∑
x2
|x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2 |B (53)
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and sends the B part to the adversary. The adversary can simulate the above strategy locally, by creating |x1〉, |φx1〉
and the maximally mixed state on n dimensions |Φ〉. After relabelling the registers, the adversary holds the state
1
2n
∑
x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |φx1〉 〈φx1 |A ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2 |D ⊗ |0〉 〈0|C ⊗ |Φ〉 〈Φ|BE . (54)
To simulate the strategy in the previous section, the adversary applies S to the A, B and C registers, followed
by a measurement on the resulting A,A′ registers. Conditional on measurement outcome ΠAA′ , she then applies a
generalised Bell measurement on the D and E registers in order to teleport the unknown state |φx2〉 into the B register
which was acted on by S (modulo a teleportation correction). If the appropriate measurement outcome is not found,
the adversary does not perform the Bell measurement and instead starts again. The resulting state is
1
2n
∑
x2
ax1x′2ΠAA′
∣∣∣Ψx1x′2〉〈Ψx1x′2 ∣∣∣Π†AA′ . (55)
Notice the state contains x′2 since the Bell measurement does not faithfully teleport the state, and a correction is
required which we have not performed. If the dimension of the hidden matching states is a power of two, the correction
operators are simply tensor products of the Pauli operators [39]. Crucially, all corrections define a bijective mapping
between x′2 and x2, so that as x2 cycles over all possible values so does x
′
2, and the probabilities are not affected (all
corrections are equally likely, which must be the case so that information is not communicated faster than light).
The state in Eq. (55) is the same as the state in Eq. (51), but the measurements applied by the verifiers are
correlated with the X2 register held by the bank. Therefore, the verifiers failure probabilities are not the same when
measuring the two states. Measurements on the state in Eq. (51) leads to a failure probability of
1
2n
∑
x2
[
ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |Π†AA′
]
+ ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B′ ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2 |Π†AA′
]]
, (56)
while measurements on the state in Eq. (55) lead to a failure probability of
1
2n
∑
x2
[
ax1x′2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B ΠAA′
∣∣∣Ψx1x′2〉〈Ψx1x′2∣∣∣Π†AA′]+ ax1x′2Tr[Γinc,x2B′ ΠAA′ ∣∣∣Ψx1x′2〉〈Ψx1x′2∣∣∣Π†AA′]
]
. (57)
The difference being the appearance of x′2 in the second expression. Nevertheless, the two can be made equal if
the verifiers are forced to apply the teleportation correction unitary to their measurement outcomes. In effect, this
correction relabels the measurement outcomes so that Γinc,x2 → Γinc,x′2 . Following this correction, the two expressions
(56) and (57) are equal. This shows that the assumption in Eq. (52) leads to a contradiction, since it shows an
individual attack in the modified scenario can achieve the same error probability as a coherent attack, and the error
probabilities achievable in the modified individual scenario are the same as for the unmodified individual scenario.
